A hagyományunk egyik kérdése az, hogy az eszményeinknek van-e, és mekkora szerepe az emberi cselekvések terén. Az eszményi európai ember valamilyen, esetleg vitatható, esetleg megalapozhatatlan eszményt követ, de uralja szenvedélyeit, vágyait, érzelmeit és érdekeit. A kereszténység ezt felfokozta az erkölcsi cselekvése terén, míg a felvilágosodás a politikában tette mindenek feletti problémává a politikai tudást és eszményeket. Ezt az intellektualizált cselekvési eszményt azonban rendre kikezdik, és ezek a kihívást jelentő magyarázatok a romantikától a marxizmusig a valós cselekvésekre hivatkoznak, amelyek többé vagy (...) kevésbé eltérnek az eszménytől. Egy nemzedékkel ezelőtt, de még ma is sokak számára a valódi cselekvésmotívum az (osztály)érdek volt, míg a mai wokery a személyes érzéseket tette legitim és bármilyen cselekvést igazoló motívummá, míg az eszményeket az elnyomás eszközeinek tekinti, hiszen az eszményeket követni próbáló ember korlátozza önmagát. A kötet írásai a cselekvés szkeptikus megközelítését sugallják: a cselekvéseknek mindig sokféle motívuma lehet, valamilyen eszmény követésétől kezdve érdekek, szenvedélyek és érzelmek követéséig, és ezekről csak feltételezéseink lehetnek. A tapasztalatunk az, hogy a túlmoralizált politika ugyanúgy kellemetlen világot eredményez, mint az alulmoralizált. (shrink)

On what grounds will the rational man become a Christian? It is often assumed by many, especially non-Christians, that he will become a Christian if and only if he judges that the evidence available to him shows that it is more likely than not that the Christian theological system is true, that, in mathematical terms, on the evidence available to him, the probability of its truth is greater than half. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether or (...) not this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the rational man to adopt Christianity. (shrink)

An alleged moral right to informational privacy assumes that we should have control over information about ourselves. What is the philosophical justification for this control? I think that one prevalent answer to this question—an answer that has to do with the justification of negative rights generally—will not do.

In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams is rather severe on what he thinks of as an ethics of obligation. He has in mind by this Kant and W. D. Ross. For many, obligation seems the very core of ethics and the moral realm, and lives more generally are seen through the prism of this notion. This, according to Williams, flattens out our lives and moral experience and fails to take into account things which are obviously important to (...) our lives. Once we take these things into account, what do we do if they come into conflict with some of our moral obligations, as Williams, in his earlier writings on moral luck, thought to be the case. I want here to explore some of these ideas, in a way that I think harmonious with Williams's general bent though not one that I intend as in any way detailed exegesis of Williams's work. (shrink)

In this article we show that it is possible to completely classify the degrees of r.e. bases of r.e. vector spaces in terms of weak truth table degrees. The ideas extend to classify the degrees of complements and splittings. Several ramifications of the classification are discussed, together with an analysis of the structure of the degrees of pairs of r.e. summands of r.e. spaces.

This book aims to provide an introduction to Aristotle's Politics, highlighting the major themes and arguments offered in the scholar's work. It begins with a discussion on what Aristotle perceives as human good, which he had described as the ethical purpose of political science, and how he views the political community, or the polis, as a community of persons formed with a view to some good purpose and a supreme entity in the sense that it is not just one aspect (...) of city-state society but is the whole of that society. The book also discusses Aristotle's arguments against the abolition of the household for the ruling class and the communism of families and property, which Plato advocates, and highlights certain inconsistencies and vulnerabilities in his arguments supporting natural slavery and on how the husband should rule over his wife and children. The book presents Aristotle's account of the relative merits of six different types of constitution and his views on the best possible constitution that will help in the realization of the polis' true purpose of achieving the good life. It ends with a discussion on Aristotle's view of political science in relation to the protection of particular constitutions against constitutional change and political disorder. (shrink)

For a theist, a man's duty is to conform to the announced will of God. Yet a theist who makes this claim about duty is faced with a traditional dilemma first stated in Plato's Euthyphro—are actions which are obligatory, obligatory because God makes them so, or does God urge us to do them because they are obligatory anyway? To take the first horn of this dilemma is to claim that God can of his free choice make any action obligatory or (...) non-obligatory. The critic claims that the theist cannot take this horn, for God cannot make bad actions good. (shrink)

_Purpose__._ This article aims to analyse the ways of free communicative solution of civil society problems as a basis for the development of deliberative democracy on the example of the activities of volunteer organisations. _Theoretical basis._ The conceptual basis of the study is Immanuel Kant’s philosophical understanding of individual obligations as the basis for the institutionalisation of social communication. This concept is developed by Jürgen Habermas in the direction of deliberative democracy. Max Weber, Quentin Skinner, and other theorists give a (...) special status to language communication in the functioning of social institutions. Contemporary Ukrainian researchers analyse the volunteer movement as the basis for the communicative implementation of human freedom. _Originality__._ Practices of political performance in society contribute to the specific and contextual solution of the tasks of communication theory and provide answers to questions about sustainable human needs, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, contribute to solving the political problems of everyday life. Grassroots socio-political movements, and especially volunteer movements, practice free discussion of various social problems, which is the basis of the deliberative democracy. _Conclusions._ Overcoming value differences between members of society is more effective in deliberative practices as the core of social communication in a democratic society. The substantive way to find new forms of communication is to use deliberative practices of implementing freedom to improve the functioning of social institutions. The formal way is aimed at attracting the experience of volunteer organisations in using the minimum necessary forms of bureaucratisation of social institutions in a democratic society. (shrink)

Mr Olding's recent attack on my exposition of the argument from design gives me an opportunity to defend the central theses of my original article. My article pointed out that there were arguments from design of two types—those which take as their premisses regularities of copresence and those which take as their premisses regularities of succession. I sought to defend an argument of the second type. One merit of such an argument is that there is no doubt about the truth (...) of its premisses. Almost all objects in the world behave in a highly regular way describable by scientific laws. Further, any scientific explanation of such a regularity must invoke some more general regularity. The most general regularities of all are, as such, scientifically inexplicable. The question arises whether there is a possible explanation of another kind which can be provided for them, and whether their occurrence gives any or much support to that explanation. I urged that we do explain some phenomena by explanation of an entirely different kind from the scientific. We explain states of affairs by the action of agents who bring them about intentionally of their own choice. Regularities of succession, as well as other phenomena may be explained in this way. Explanation of this kind I will term intentional explanation. Intentional explanation of some phenomenon E consists in adducing an agent A who brought E about of his own choice and a further end G which, he believed, would be forwarded by the production of E. (shrink)

The invocation of moral rights in moral/social debate today is a recipe for deadlock in our consideration of substantive issues. How we treat animals and humans in part should derive from the value of their lives, which is a function of the quality of their lives, which in turn is a function of the richness of their lives. Consistency in argument requires that humans with a low quality of life should be chosen as experimental subjects over animals with a higher (...) quality of life. (shrink)

My interest is in two of the four conditions which must be satisfied if the doctrine of double effect is to be successfully employed. One of these involves the distinction between direct and oblique intention, And I deny that this distinction is the index of character or goodness adherents to the doctrine take it to be. Rather, I emphasize the notion of "control responsibility", In considering several cases around which discussion of the doctrine has focused. I develop this notion, In (...) the course of rejecting several attempts to render it superfluous, And then sustain it, In the face of a possible rival. Finally, I consider a second condition of the doctrine, One which turns upon the view that the order of causation between an evil and a good effect of an act is morally significant, And I suggest that this view is mistaken. (shrink)

ACCORDING TO POPPER, SCIENTIFIC THEORIES ARE TO BE ACCEPTED IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE FALSIFIABLE AND IN SO FAR AS THEY HAVE BEEN CORROBORATED. THE CONCEPTS OF FALSIFIABILITY AND CORROBORATION ARE SUBMITTED TO DETAILED ANALYSIS. THE POINT OF ACCEPTING THEORIES, ACCORDING TO POPPER, IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH VERISIMILITUDE. HOWEVER THE BEST WE CAN DO IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMILITUDE. POPPER’S CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTING THEORIES WILL ONLY LEAD TO THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMILITUDE ON NON-POPPERIAN (...) ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INDUCTION. (shrink)

In unseen and unacknowledged specter, an “X,” attends at every economic feast, and stands at the elbow of every modern wiseacre. It confounds the forecaster with seeming malice showing itself only in the event and even then with impish and uncertain effect. It laughs at pretensions to knowledge; it tantalizes all figurers, haunts all generalizers and keeps itself to itself, a shadow, an unknown. But phantom as it is, it is still a force, a potent, active, generative substance, mysterious in (...) genesis, related to a dream, but able to accomplish miracles of reality. For the purpose here it will be called the creative experience. (shrink)